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Reviewed work(s):
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 461-479
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283888
Accessed: 05/02/2013 09:37

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Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun

ROBERT IRWIN

‘Where the quiet-coloured end of evening smiles,
Miles and miles
On the solitary pastures where our sheep
Half-asleep
Tinkle homeward through the twilight, stray or stop
As they crop –
Was the site once of a city great and gay,
(So they say)
Of our country’s very capital, its prince
Ages since
Held his court in, gathered, councils, wielding far
Peace or war.

Robert Browning, ‘Love among the Ruins’

In the years before the First World War the Orient Express used to run a
daily train de luxe between London and Vienna. From Vienna there were
trains every Monday and Thursday (first class only) to Constantinople. The
journey took 75 hours and cost £22 and 11 shillings. In those palmy days
the train travelled from empire to empire and British travellers customarily
travelled without a passport. By 1921 everything had changed. British
passports came in with the Defence of the Realm Act of 1915 and papers
were frequently demanded on the route to Istanbul. The Orient Express
passed through nation states with uncertain futures towards a Turkey which
was fighting to become a nation. It was on the Orient Express, on the line
between Nish and Adrianople in September 1921, that Arnold Toynbee, in
a moment of creative vision, first sketched the plan of his massive A Study
of History, the writing of which was to occupy him for the next 40 years.²

Arnold Toynbee was born in 1889 and educated at Winchester and
Balliol. (As an undergraduate Toynbee became friendly with the Arabist
D.S. Margoliouth. The latter told Toynbee that he made a custom of reading
the Quran in Arabic once a year. This commanded Toynbee’s admiration
‘for the Quran is appreciably longer than the Bible’. This reminiscence
suggests that Toynbee never actually looked at the Quran, for it is in fact
shorter than the New Testament.)³ During the First World War Toynbee
worked among other things on the Blue Book on the Armenian massacres and deportations in the Ottoman empire, later published commercially as *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*. As a member of the Middle East section he attended the Paris Peace Conference of 1918–19 (as did T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell). In the years immediately after the Great War, he interested himself in the Greco-Turkish question. From 1915 onwards he began the study of Turkish with Ali Reza Bey at the School of Oriental Studies, London University, and in the years 1919–24 he studied Arabic with Hamilton Gibb and Thomas Arnold (though he seems never to have acquired a comfortable reading knowledge in that language). In 1919 he was appointed to the Koraes Chair in Greek at King’s College, London. However, the uproar created by the publication of *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey* forced his resignation in 1923. From 1926 to 1955 he was director of studies at Chatham House. He died in 1975.

In 1933 the first three volumes of his *magnum opus, A Study of History*, appeared. Volumes four to six were published in 1939 (and, given the year, these volumes were naturally much concerned with the nature of militarism). Volumes seven to ten were published in 1954 and in these volumes religious issues assumed a new prominence. Finally in 1961, he published *Reconsiderations*, a volume in which he attempted to take account of criticisms levelled at the earlier volumes. In 1921, when Toynbee first had his premonitory vision of *A Study of History*, there was still formally an Ottoman Caliphate (it was abolished in 1924). Turkey’s frontiers were a matter of dispute and there was bloody fighting in Anatolia. Egyptians in Alexandria were rioting against British rule, while Syria was reluctantly submitting to French control. In general, Britain and France seemed to be consolidating their hold over the Near East and North Africa. By the time Toynbee had finished with his grand historical work, most of the Middle East and North Africa had secured its independence from colonial rule, though a bitter anti-colonialist war in Algeria still continued.

As Director of Studies at Chatham House Toynbee produced the *Survey of International Affairs* (annually 1925–46) on current issues, including, among much else, reports on the Palestine question. Toynbee’s preoccupation with current issues informed and shaped his *A Study of History*. To take two examples among many, both the early success of Abd al-Krim’s revolt in Morocco in the late 1920s and the Waziri troubles on the North-West Frontier of British India impressed upon Toynbee the ability of barbarians to imitate the techniques of imperial powers, as well as their ability to strain the defences of imperial powers out of all proportion to the barbarians’ own numbers and resources. Toynbee wrote in an age of emergent nations and nationalisms. In his eyes, nations were a late development and an undesirable one. He hoped that the nation state system was only the prelude.
to the establishment of a global civilization. However, his anti-nationalism
was not without ambiguities. For example, he admired Atatürk. He also
promoted the cause of Arab nationalism against imperialism and Zionism.
He always inclined to support the emergent Third World nations in their
struggles against the British and French.

Emergent nations, national boundaries, the politics of the nation state
were the stuff of the International Yearbooks produced at Chatham House
under his direction. However, they were not the subject of A Study of History.
Civilizations were. Toynbee argued that civilizations were the smallest
intelligible units of historical investigation. A Study of History was intended,
among other things, to be an extended polemic against the conventional
partitions of territories and periods employed in twentieth-century histori-
ography. It was also a way to describe the world’s past in a way which was
not centred on Europe and ‘The Triumph of the West’. As Toynbee put it,
‘Being an historian means trying to jump clear of the particular time and
place at which one happened to have been born and brought up. It means
trying to look at History from some standpoint that is outside one’s own,
and that is more central and therefore more objective than one’s own is
likely to be.’\(^8\) According to Toynbee, not only were civilizations the smallest
intelligible unit of investigation, they were additionally defined by the fact
that they went through processes peculiar to civilizations, processes which
he went on to sketch out.

Toynbee’s notion of civilization can be visualized (perhaps fancifully and
rather unsympathetically) as an array of automata, which have been set in
motion at various times, but which independently go through what are
broadly the same motions. Creative minorities drive the civilizations, guid-
ing the arms in a characteristic see-saw motion of challenge and response
and, at the same time, spraying out threads of affiliation and apper-entation
to neighbouring civilizations. But, as creative minorities decay into
dominant minorities, the machines run down and their movements become
increasingly circumscribed. A civilization whose engine has run down
restructures itself as a universal state. Thereafter a fixed and doomed rhythm
sets in – rout, rhythm – rout, rhythm – rout, rhythm. The focus of historical
interest moves away from what had been the central engine. Now one
focuses instead on the internal proletariat as well as on the external
proletariat (which was Toynbee’s term for the barbarian horde on the
frontier). However, neither of these forces, whether engaged in frustrating
the impulses of the central battery or in creatively imitating it, can do
anything to arrest the final collapse. As the automata fall apart, ‘fossil’ and
‘diaspora’ cultures fall off and roll away. It may be that from the smoke of
the disintegrating machinery, the forms of a nascent higher religion are
discernible.
At every stage there have been subsidiary mechanisms clicking and whirring, coils and levers and breaks following the laws of etherealization, of compensation, of diminishing returns, climatic screws loosening and tightening, racial groups spinning on topographic roundabouts, ghost evocations of lost empires and caliphates rising like steam from the machinery and cultures pseudomorphically pouring into new cultural moulds. And above the din of whirring and clicking one may hear if one strains the great regular boom of Yin and Yang filling the workshop of History where these engines are being tested by their creator, God.

Toynbee’s version of history was metaphor-laden and, as such it drew on literary works and appealed particularly to literary men. As a work of belles-lettres, it drew on literary sources and informed by them. Toynbee was steeped in the works of Meredith and Browning. In particular the theme of ‘Challenge and Response’ is prominent in Browning:

Then welcome each rebuff
That turns earth’s smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand, but to!9

One particular literary image which had a diffuse yet unmistakable impact on Toynbee’s thinking is worth drawing attention to here – that of the Asiatic barbarian horde, conceived of as simultaneously the destroyer and the potential renewal of Western civilization. The image was a popular one in the opening decades of the twentieth century as the following works testify: Herman Hesse’s Blik ins Chaos (1920), Vladimir Solovyev’s War, Progress and the End of History (1900, tr. A Bakshy, 1915), T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland (1922), Saint-John Perse’s Anabase (1924) and Constantin Cavafy’s poem Perimenontas tous varvarous (‘Waiting for the Barbarians’, 1904). Considering the literary interaction from the other direction, Toynbee’s influence has probably been stronger on literary men than on historians. Among those so influenced were Aldous Huxley, Ernst Robert Curtius and Ortega y Gasset. Toynbee’s theories of the cyclical rise and fall of civilizations have proved especially popular among science fiction writers and his ideas were excitingly reworked in such fictions as Isaac Asimov’s Foundation Trilogy (1951–53), Charles Harness’s The Paradox Men (1953), Frank Herbert’s Dune (1965) and Larry Niven’s The World Out of Time (1967).10

Even so, any habitué of London’s second-hand bookshops will know that (with the possible exceptions of Sir Arthur Bryant’s Age of Endurance and Eisenhower’s Crusade in Europe) there is no book one is more likely to find
than the two-volume abridged edition of Toynbee’s *A Study of History.* 11 Whether in its abridged or in its complete form, Toynbee’s book is no longer fashionable. From the 1930s onwards, the book was subjected to a series of damaging attacks by professional historians, A.J.P. Taylor, H.R. Trevor-Roper, R.H. Tawney and Peter Geyl among them. 12 As far as Toynbee’s views on the history of the Middle East and Islamic civilization were concerned, these were critically appraised by some of the leading figures working in the field, among them Gustav von Grunebaum, Elie Kedourie, Bertold Spuler and Gotthold Weil. 13 Of course, many of Toynbee’s errors in this area were not the product of his system, but reflected his reading of the relatively small volume of orientalist literature that was available at the time. He made heavy use of such works as Thomas Arnold’s *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924) and Edward Granville Browne’s *Literary History of Persia,* (2 vols., London, 1902–6).

Nevertheless, while Toynbee’s mistakes were hard to miss, it was still possible for Middle Eastern historians to find fruitful insights and structuring ideas in *A Study of History* and in fact his influence on writers in the field of Middle Eastern history was considerable. Albert Hourani, in particular, paid eloquent and moving tribute to Toynbee’s scholarship and vision as well as noting the influence of *A Study of History* on Hourani’s own work, particularly with regard to minorities and the notion of cultural mimesis. 14 Marshal Hodgson’s three-volume *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization* (1974) obviously owed much to *A Study of History* – especially Hodgson’s determination to study civilizations in terms of their inner development and the emphasis on the quasi-autonomy of Turko-Iranian civilization and on mimesis of the ‘proletariat’. Nevertheless Hodgson did now swallow Toynbee whole, for he believed that the fundamental unit of study for the historian was not a ‘civilization’, but rather the whole region which extended from the Atlantic to the Pacific shore of Asia. 15 Hodgson also, of course, derived some of his ideas from a direct reading of Ibn Khaldun. It is more difficult to be dogmatic about influences elsewhere. However, David Ayalon’s *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom. A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society* (London, 1956) was also perhaps influenced, albeit at several removes, by Toynbee’s ideas on challenge and response. Similarly, Montgomery Watt’s *Muhammad at Mecca* (1953) and his *Muhammad at Medina* (1956) echo Toynbee’s portrayal of the Prophet as a man who obeyed the law of withdrawal and return (but who however failed to obey the law of etherealization). Finally, Ernest Gellner’s reworking and updating of Ibn Khaldun may have owed something to the intervening influence of Toynbee, as is suggested by his use of the concept of a reservoir of the external tribal proletariat. 16 Toynbee’s anti-colonial and anti-Zionist position would also have recommended him
to Arab historians and the first volume of Somervell's abridgement of Toynbee was translated into Arabic in 1955, thus making his ideas accessible to the Arab world and Arab historians.\textsuperscript{17}

The positive and negative critiques referred to above make it unnecessary for me to undertake a general survey of Toynbee's views about Islam and what he took to be Islamic civilization. Instead more restricted examination of the relationship between \textit{A Study of History} and Ibn Khaldun's \textit{Muqaddima} provides a framework for thinking about a range of important issues in Islamic history. What sort of relation was there between nomads and slave states? What sort of culture do nomads have? What causes nomad invasions of settled societies? Is there an inevitable cycle of decay which dynasties of nomad origin must undergo? What sort of relationship was there between the slave state regimes of the Mamluks and the Ottomans on the one hand and the nomad dynasties on the other hand? Not only have such questions loomed large in the writings of Ibn Khaldun and Toynbee, they have continued to attract debate in more recent decades.\textsuperscript{18}

In considering Toynbee's version of Ibn Khaldun, one should bear in mind that Toynbee's transmission of the latter's theories was of some importance, for, until the appearance of Franz Rosenthal's translation, Toynbee did more than anyone else to popularize Ibn Khaldun's theories to the English-speaking world.\textsuperscript{19} A consideration of the relationship between Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun has to be somewhat complex. There is what Toynbee said Ibn Khaldun said. Then there is what Ibn Khaldun actually said. Then one should consider the limits of Toynbee's agreement with Ibn Khaldun and the alternative sources which mediated or in some cases substituted for Toynbee's superficially Khaldunian vision of history.

The North African philosopher-historian, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) was one of Toynbee's intellectual heroes – in the same grand pantheon (presented in volume 10 of \textit{A Study of History}) as St Augustine, Juwayni, Clarendon and Gibbon. In Toynbee's eyes, Ibn Khaldun had all the distinguishing marks of a truly great man. First he exemplified the law of withdrawal. He withdrew from a turbulent career in the Muslim courts of North Africa in 1375. Secondly, he was a perfect exemplar of the law of etherealization (by which Toynbee meant the abstraction or spiritualization of lived experience), for in a four-year period of retirement he wrote the \textit{Muqaddima}, a theoretical examination of the laws of history – that is of the principles underlying the rise and fall of dynasties. Thirdly, he exemplified the law of return, as he returned to pursue his career in the politics of the Maghrib and Egypt.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, as one might have expected, there was much in the contents of the \textit{Muqaddima} that was congenial to Toynbee. Ibn Khaldun, like Gibbon, Volney and Toynbee himself, received his impulse to write his
historical work from ruins – in Ibn Khaldun’s case by ruinous state of North Africa.21 The historian’s epiphanic vision can be considered as a topos in Western culture. (However, Toynbee held it against the Arabs that in the past they had shown no curiosity about the ruins which surrounded them.22) In the Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun had written about the evidence of former grandeur surviving in an era of chaos and desolation: ‘Formerly the whole region between the Sudan and the Mediterranean had been settled. This fact is attested by the relics of civilization there, such as monuments, architectural sculpture, and the visible remains of villages and hamlets.’23 How had such grandeur given way to desolation? Was the passage from imperial grandeur to desolation inevitable? Ibn Khaldun’s attempt to answer the question was a unique one in Islamic historiography.

As far as Ibn Khaldun was concerned, the history of North Africa was punctuated by two great devastating invasions, first that of the seventh-century Arab Islamic armies and then that of the Bani Hilal and the Bani Sulaym tribes in the eleventh century. The first of these invasions occupied the town and did little or no damage to sedentary society. The second invasion by Arab tribes, whom he reported were despatched by a Fatimid vizier, devastated North Africa in 1051 and the shadows of this devastation were still visible in fourteenth-century North Africa. The results of the arrival of those nomadic Arabs were still visible 350 years later.

The notion that rise and fall of civilizations is to be understood in terms of an opposition between nomad and sedentary is central to Ibn Khaldun’s thought. Nomads, stimulated by the challenge of the desert’s hardship, acquire superior esprit de corps (‘asabiyah). Sedentary groups, by contrast, have little or not ‘asabiyah and nomads with ‘asabiyah will triumph over a sedentary culture even though they are outnumbered by the forces of the sedentary culture they conquer. Although ‘asabiyah provides the bonding necessary for conquest, religion alone allows the foundation of durable empires, for religion doubles the effectiveness of a tribe which already has ‘asabiyah.

The earliest Arab invasion of North Africa, in the first century of Islam, was driven by religion. The eleventh-century depredations of the Arab tribes of Bani Hilal and Bani Sulaym were not and their consequences were purely negative. Toynbee had no reason to call into question the account given by Ibn Khaldun of the effects of the Bani Hilal invasion, though these views have since come under fire from many directions.24 The seventh-century Arabs were able to fund a durable empire encompassing North Africa. Nevertheless, as they became sedentary, their ‘asabiyah decayed and the dominant Arab elite fell prey to the twin perils of luxury and autocracy. According to Ibn Khaldun, four generations, or roughly 120 years, was the normal span of an empire established by nomads over sedentaries. Toynbee agreed with all this. More generally, he praised the Muqaddima for its grand
sweep. The *Mugaddima*, like *A Study of History*, demonstrated that the historical process was cyclical. Moreover, Toynbee found Ibn Khaldun to be congenially pessimistic. Toynbee, whose *A Study of History* became more theocentric as it progressed, also welcomed Ibn Khaldun’s view (related in Toynbee’s words) ‘that human affairs do not constitute an intelligible field of study’. According to Toynbee, ‘Ibn Khaldun ... gave a vision of history bursting the bounds of this World and breaking through into an Other World’. Ibn Khaldun had progressed from sociology to theology. Such broad affinities attracted Toynbee and led him to appropriate Ibn Khaldun as an intellectual ancestor. (As Jorge Luis Borges has observed, ‘The fact is that every writer creates his own precursors. His work modified our perception of the past.’)25

However, Toynbee’s vision of history differed from that of Ibn Khaldun in a number of important respects. Toynbee rejected the view that ‘asabiyya was virtually a monopoly of the nomads – or the ‘external proletarian’ in his peculiar terminology.26 He deplored the fact that Ibn Khaldun was unable to envisage urban communities as possessing ‘asabiyya. Surely, Toynbee thought, the inhabitants of Italian city states of the fourteenth century had possessed ‘asabiyya? Toynbee denied that the ‘asabiyya developed as a product of nomadic living in the desert made those tribes more capable than others. He argued that the particular cycle of rise and decay sketched out by Ibn Khaldun applied only to empires founded by nomads of which (according to Toynbee’s system) there had only been five in the history of the world: Amorites, Chaldians, seventh-eighth century Arabs, Mongols and Ottomans.

Ibn Khaldun’s failings were to be ascribed to the relativity of his thought – that is, it was relative to time and place and the information available to him in the backwater that was the Maghreb in the fourteenth century. (But it is surely a paradox that the historical philosophy of the man from the medieval North African backwater seems currently to be more fashionable than that of Toynbee, the urbane twentieth-century academic.) Toynbee had been stimulated by his reading of Ibn Khaldun, but, as was the case with his reading of Gibbon, the stimulus took the form of provocation rather than simple absorption. One of the primary aims of *A Study of History* had been to disprove Gibbon’s contention that the triumph of barbarism and religion was the ruin of the Roman empire, or indeed of any empire. So Toynbee’s version of history sought to prove that barbarian invasions are a symptom of the empire’s decay, rather than its cause. For complex reasons, he was unwilling to accept Ibn Khaldun’s assertion that nomad hordes could be the prime agents in either the creation or the decay of civilizations. Civilizations are always the engines of history and they always carry the seeds of their decay within themselves.
Toynbee thought of the nomads as an external proletariat waiting on the edge of civilization (Roman, Islamic, Chinese). The nomad has had to struggle very hard to master his environment. In order to master that environment, he has had to adapt to it and, in adapting to it, he incurs the penalty of over-specialization – that is he loses the power to be socially creative. Since nomads are not creative and not innovators, they do not really initiate their invasions. Rather, those invasions are to be explained in terms of the push of changing climatic conditions, as well as the pull of a vacuum in the neighbouring sedentary society. In Toynbee's model, the nomad seems hardly human, for he more closely resembles Dr Doolittle's Push-Me-Pull-You beast. The Mongol for instance succeeded in transforming himself into a centaur, but in doing so he renounced humanity. At various times, Toynbee compared nomadic groupings to the sea, or, alternatively, to insect-hives. These are dehumanizing similes and it is probably significant that in his main discussion of nomads Toynbee drifted on from discussing the nomad to ponderings on Bolshevism and dystopic visions of the future.

When Toynbee came to deal with those nomad invasions which were apparently driven by ideological motivations, such as, for example, the seventh-century Islamic invasion and the eighteenth-century Wahhabi campaigns, Toynbee argued (quite reasonably) that such religious movements were not really the creations of a nomadic desert culture, but were rather the creations of oasis dwellers and their military campaigns were similarly directed by oasis dwellers. The nomad's potential creativity was invariably 'arrested' by the harshness of his environment and his narrow concentration on adapting to it. Creativity could not lie within the tribe or horde – still less in the military horde. As conquerors, the nomads brought no creative innovations to the societies they conquered. They were unproductive, parasitic drones. At best, as in the cases of the Mongols and the Ottomans, the conquerors converted themselves from shepherds of flocks to shepherds of men. (All this was in contrast to the views H.G. Wells put forward in his history of the world, where the nomad was praised as the renewer of culture – or as the plough which breaks up the old soil, of decayed civilizations. Wells's Mongols were free spirits, adventurous folk bringing new life to the communities they passed through.) Some parts of A Study of History were retracted or amended in the volume devoted to Reconsiderations, but the portrait of the nomad as mindless external proletariat was never explicitly retracted by Toynbee. However, when he came to write his fine monograph on tenth-century Byzantine history, the climate theory had been quietly dropped and Chinggis Khan was praised for his organizing genius.

Although Toynbee's assessment of Ibn Kaldun was appreciative, it was
neither fair nor accurate. Ibn Khaldun was judged as a failed historian of civilizations. However, Ibn Khaldun had set out to write a history of dynasties (*duwal s. dawla*), not a history of civilizations. Incidentally, the Arabic word for dynasty originally carried within the implication of rotation, of cyclical rise and decline.\textsuperscript{35} Secondly, Ibn Khaldun did not seek to elaborate a theory that would apply to all dynasties the world over, or even to all dynasties in the *Dar al-Islam*. Explicitly his theory was designed to make sense of North African history in the Islamic period.\textsuperscript{36} It is true that he drew examples from pre-Islamic history and the history of eastern lands and it is true also that he extended the scope of *Kitab al-‘Ibar* (the chronicle which followed on from the *Muqaddima*) to cover eastern Islamic lands. Nevertheless, the *Muqaddima* was primarily addressed to theoretical problems arising out of the study of North African history and the role of the Berbers in that history.

In reproducing Ibn Khaldun’s comments on the deleterious role of the Bani Hilal, Toynbee grossly overstressed the importance of this invasion on Ibn Khaldun’s thinking. At the opening of the *Muqaddima*, Ibn Khaldun does indeed remark on the eleventh century invasion, but he placed greater emphasis on the ravages of the Black Death in the fourteenth century: ‘in the middle of the eighth century [*hijri*] civilization both in the East and the West was visited by a destructive plague which devastated nations and caused populations to vanish. It swallowed up many of the good things of civilization and wiped them out. It overtook dynasties at the time of their senility, when they had reached their duration … It was as if the voice of existence in the world had called out for oblivion and restriction and the world had responded to its call.’\textsuperscript{37} Ibn Khaldun went on to declare the world was so different after the Black Death that this drastic change necessitated his writing of a historical account. Thus the writing of the *Muqaddima* and the *Kitab al-‘Ibar* was a response to the recent plague (in the 1340s), rather than to the distant turmoil of the eleventh century. Incidentally, Ibn Khaldun was not consistent on the causes of the great plague, but in a striking passage he suggested that plague was a product of civilization, for, if too many people were concentrated in the cities, then such a concentration led to the putrefaction of the air.\textsuperscript{38}

In stressing or overemphasizing the importance of the Bani Hilal and in some of his other interpretations of the *Muqaddima*, Toynbee was not relying on his own unsupported reading of that book, but was rather drawing on *Les siècles obscurs du Maghreb* (Paris, 1927) by Emile Félix Gautier, who was at that time Professor of Geography at the University of Algiers. For Gautier, and then for Toynbee, Ibn Khaldun was the solitary genius of the Islamic late Middle Ages (according to Toynbee ‘a nasty brutish civilization’). Ibn Khaldun was, in Gautier’s words, ‘unique, il écrase tout, il est génial’.
Moreover, Ibn Khaldun was a member of the same school of history writing as Joinville and St Simon – the gentilhomme school of history writing. Comparisons with Western gentry were permissible, for though an Oriental, Ibn Khaldun had a Western perception of history. There was ‘un parfum de renaissance’ about him. Ibn Khaldun had struggles to make sense of Maghribi history, though palpably that history showed no evolution in a Western sense, so Ibn Khaldun was doomed to brilliant failure.

In his monograph on Ibn Khaldun, Yves Lacoste has well explored the way Gautier made the Hilali invasions the fulcrum point of North African history, in which Arab was equated with nomad and nomad with destroyer, in opposition to the indigenous sedentary Berber. Gautier seems to have believed that the historical message of Ibn Khaldun’s writings was that the North African Arabs and Berbers were and would always remain unfit for nationhood. According to Gautier, the Arab had lineage, but not patrimony. There is surely a sad paradox in the fact that Toynbee, in seeking to escape a Eurocentric vision and in attempting to find support among historians of other cultures for the ideas he put forward in A Study of History, should have placed himself in the hands of Gautier. However, Toynbee, who was to argue in A Study of History that the Islamic conquests and the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates (somewhat belatedly) provided the Achaemenian empire, a product of Syriac civilization, with its universal empire, after roughly nine centuries of Hellenic rule, must have found congenial Gautier’s similarly bold thesis that Berber culture was the revival of Carthaginian civilization after so many centuries of Roman rule.

On occasions when Toynbee side-stepped Gautier, he made use not exactly of Ibn Khaldun’s Mугaddima but, as has been noted, of De Slane’s translation of it, Les Proléromènes. His dependence on this translation brought problems. For one thing Toynbee did not realize that Ibn Khaldun used ‘Arab and its plural ‘Urban sometimes to apply to those people who were genealogically and linguistically Arab and sometimes more specifically to refer those Arabs who pursued a pastoral, camel-rearing mode of existence in the desert. Similarly, Toynbee failed to realise that, in contradicting ‘umran hadari to ‘umran badawi, Ibn Khaldun was contrasting settled urban culture not to nomadic Bedouin culture alone, but rather to the culture of both the Bedouin and the Fellahin (peasants). ‘Asabiyya was usually translated by de Slane as esprit de corps. This is in itself was not a terrible translation, but when that translation was transplanted into A Study of History, it acquired misleading Bergsonian overtones of ‘élán vital. ‘Asabiyya was subsequently translated by Franz Rosenthal in his English translation as ‘group feeling’. The concept carried by the Arabic word is thought by many to derive from the root verb ‘asaba meaning ‘he twisted’, so that the word might possibly have summoned up the image of men twisted
together by blood links or physical proximity. Alternatively, perhaps 'asabiyya should be derived from the noun 'isaba, which may refer to something wound round the head, potentially then a headband which might serve as a sign of tribal or factional allegiance. Another sense of 'isaba, which we will come to, is band or league (presumably held together by 'asabiyya). A careful reading of Ibn Khaldun, of the 'Ibar and the Ta’rif (the 'Ibar’s autobiographical tailpiece) as well as the Muqaddima, shows that Ibn Khaldun did not think of 'asabiyya as being a monopoly of the nomad, nor did he think that blood relationship was the only form of 'asabiyya bonding.43 Clients of tribal groups may acquire 'asabiyya. Urban groups, such as the Mamluks of fourteenth-century Cairo, could constitute an effective and cohesive group ('isaba).44 As we shall see below, a Mamluk corps infused with an artificial 'asabiyya could provide a ruler with renewed strength. Ibn Khaldun did not think that the rise and fall of dynasties was solely to be interpreted in terms of the rise of nomad conquerors with 'asabiyya and their subsequent decline as their 'asabiyya declined, and, for example, Ibn Khaldun regarded the Mamluk regime as one regime among many which had a different pattern of history.

Toynbee seems to have known of the Ta’rif and the ‘Ibar only through extracts cited De Slane in the annotation of the Prolégomènes. Therefore Toynbee was unaware that he and Ibn Khaldun held diametrically opposed views on Timur. Toynbee regarded Timur as a product of a sedentary society and as the military defender of that society against Eurasian nomads.45 Timur, however, betrayed his destiny by his excessive militarism and by his failure to devote himself exclusively to the Eurasian front. In Toynbee’s eyes Timur should have been able to shift the boundary between the desert and the sown in favour of the latter and this he failed to do. For Ibn Khaldun, on the other hand, Timur, though a Turk, was the heir and incarnation of Chagatai Mongol traditions and it was among the Chagatai more than anyone else that the Mongols had preserved their primitive badawa, or ‘desert-dwelling qualities’.46 One gets the impression from the Ta’rif that Ibn Khaldun was at first eager to meet such a perfect example of the kind of vigorous nomad he had been writing about in the Muqaddima.

Toynbee’s apparent reliance on Ibn Khaldun was, to borrow from Toynbee’s own terminology, a case of pseudo-affiliation. The real sources for his views on nomads and their impact on the Middle East lay firmly within his own culture. Since Toynbee not only lumped Eurasian and Afrasian nomads together, and mixed camel rearers in with horse and sheep rearers, but even at time confounded racial migrations with the set patterns of transhumant nomadism, the influences on his thinking were diverse and confusing.

To take an almost forgotten classic of belles-lettres first, Thomas de Quincey’s Revolt of the Tartars or Flight of the Kalmuk Khan and his people
from the Russian Territories to the Frontiers of China (1837) is a magnificent account of the sufferings of the Mongol Oirats under Russian rule and of their disastrous Völkerwanderung in 1771 eastwards from the Volga region.\footnote{47} De Quincey's meditation on the sufferings of this racial minority foreshadows Toynbee's writings on the Armenians, Greeks and Turks in the twentieth century. De Quincey's essay is a litany of man's inhumanity to man and a rhetorical model for writing about the sufferings of oppressed minorities. Toynbee certainly read the Revolt of the Tartars, for it is cited in A Study of History.\footnote{48} De Quincey's ability to make imaginative comparisons may have struck a sympathetic chord in Toynbee, for the former compared the Kalmuk migration not only to the movements of the Huns, Avars and Mongols, but also the French retreat from Moscow, the Israelites in the Wilderness, the Athenians during the Plague and the Peloponnesian War and Vespasian's siege of Jerusalem. It is also conceivable that De Quincey's writing may have influenced Toynbee's own metaphor-laden and dehumanized image of nomads. De Quincey wrote of the Kalmuks, 'In unity of purpose connecting this myriad of wills, and in the blind but unerring aim at a mark so remote, there is something which recalls to mind those almighty instincts that propel the migrations of the swallow and the lemming, or of the life-withering marches of the locust.'

The second source was less eloquent, but gave crucial support to Toynbee's contention that nomad invasions were not generated from within the nomad communities, but were always a blind response to external factors. Ellsworth Huntington in Civilization and Climate (3rd ed. 1924) elaborated a theory of a six-hundred-year climatic cycle which, among other things, explained the chronology of nomadic irruptions upon settled society. When the steppe became desiccated, it shrank in area and then the nomad was driven to prey upon neighbouring civilizations. When the rains became more abundant, the nomad returned to his pastures once more. This was the 'Pulse of Asia'. Toynbee extended Huntington's theory to cover African as well as Eurasian nomads. According to Toynbee, the period from 975 to 1025 was one of the key periods of desiccation and consequently of nomadic depredations, as evidenced by the Seljuks, the Cumans, the Bani Hilal and the Almoravids. The years 1575–1675 constituted another such epoch when not only the Oirats but also the Arab tribal federations of Anaza and Shamar were on the move.\footnote{49} It is perhaps worth nothing that Huntington's theories regarding the causes of nomadic invasions are no longer popular among historians of climate – if they ever were.\footnote{50} The Annales historian Emmanuel le Roi Ladurie has observed that Huntington tended to assume what he was seeking to prove and that he sometimes worked backwards from the known nomadic invasion to the presumed desiccation of the steppe.\footnote{51}

Another book which certainly had an influence on Toynbee's thinking
was a book by Owen Lattimore on Manchuria.\footnote{42} Lattimore’s book was a study of a region which in the 1920s seemed to be cockpit of the world and the arena for the competing economic ambitions of China, Russia and Japan. Up until 1931, when Japan resorted to force, the economic colonization of Manchuria by immigrant Chinese peasants seemed to be prevailing. Lattimore presented the rivalries of the regional powers as the clash of three civilizations, Chinese, Russian and Western. He regarded Japan as a thoroughly Westernized country, unlike China, where although it adopted Western technology such as railways and weapons, these features, once absorbed, acquired new functions within the structure of Chinese culture. Russia, Tsarist and then Bolshevik, was by comparison with China a young culture. Lattimore’s analysis of the crisis of the 1920s and early 30s was set firmly in a historical context and explored Manchuria’s historical role as a tribal reservoir at the disposition of the rulers of China. Manchuria was a frontier region where nomad barbarians close to the wall acquired a certain amount, however small, of Chinese culture. Lattimore explored the way in which nomad conquerors from the frontier regions took over China and, as rulers of China, absorbed the Chinese dynastic model, adopting Chinese administrative procedures and other aspects of that culture. Superficially, the nomad seemed to have conquered. More profoundly, he was conquered by the stronger cultural formation of sedentary civilization. Gradually the nomads lost the characteristics of conquering aliens and this led to their overthrow. Then a native Chinese dynasty might rule for a while, but eventually a new barbarian invasion would renew the cycle. (Lattimore’s own thinking on this topic was perhaps stimulated by Confucian theories about dynastic cycles and the role of nomads in the creation and destruction of dynasties.)\footnote{53}

That Toynbee should have found Lattimore’s ideas about Manchuria’s past and future prospects congenial is not surprising.\footnote{54} For when Lattimore was travelling in Manchuria for his research in the years he was carrying with him a copy of Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918). According to Lattimore himself, it had exercised a big and possibly deleterious influence on his book on Manchuria.\footnote{55} Spengler had put forward the notion that cultures are born young, become mature, grow old and die, and this was to influence Lattimore’s thinking about China. More particularly Lattimore absorbed Spengler’s notion of pseudomorphosis – that is, of old cultural drives accommodating themselves to superficially new cultural forms. Although Toynbee never regarded himself as any sort of disciple of Spengler, it is obvious that his philosophy of history was influenced by that of Spengler in a number of important respects.\footnote{56}

Toynbee regarded the Mamluk and Ottoman conquerors’ adaptation to settled government as ‘pseudomorphic’. This brings us to the exceptional
cases of nomads who founded durable regimes. Ibn Khaldun was primarily concerned with problems of government in North Africa and therefore not particularly interested in this question. Indeed, he barely mentions the Ottomans in the *Muqaddima*.

Nevertheless in several key passages in the Ta’rif (a quasi-autobiographical tailpiece to the *Muqaddima* and the ‘Ibar), he did note the role of Mamluks firstly in strengthening the Ayyubid dynasty with their artificially inculcated ‘asabiyya and secondly in prolonging this reinvigoration through the continuing recruitment of children of nomad stock. In the Ta’rif, he observed how al-Salih Ayyub added to the ‘isaba of his dynasty by purchasing Mamluks. In a much quoted passage from his history he commented on the Divine Providence which in the thirteenth century provided the Islamic lands with Mamluks to protect them from the infidel Mongols: ‘This he did by sending to them out of this Turkish people and out of its mighty and numerous tribes, guardian amirs and devoted defenders who are imported as slaves from the lands of heathendom to the lands of Islam. Their status of slavery is indeed a blessing … from Divine Providence. They embrace Islam with the determination of true believers, while retaining their nomadic virtues, which are undefiled by vile nature, unmixed with the filth of lustful pleasures, unmarred by the habits of civilization, with their youthful strength unshattered by excess of luxury.’

Thus the Kipchak Mamluks brought with them from their pastoral ancestry the nomadic virtues (*akhlqa al-badawiya*), but obviously their ‘asabiyya was artificially created in Egypt by education in the barracks. As we have noted above, there is no sign that Ibn Khaldun thought that the Mamluks had fallen prey to an inevitable cycle of decay. Ibn Khaldun’s admiration for the Mamluk regime and the fighting abilities of Mamluks contrasts strongly with Toynbee’s disparagement of them. (Toynbee’s poor opinion of the medieval Mamluks seems to have been influenced by French accounts of the poor showing made by the disorderly ‘neo-Mamluk’ cavalry of Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey at the Battle of the Pyramids in 1798.)

Be that as it may, when it came to explaining how the Mamluk and Ottoman regimes worked, Toynbee relied not on Ibn Khaldun’s theories, but on those of Plato. The idea that the Ottoman Palace School system and its subsidiary Janissary corps might be best understood as a retrospective acting out in history of a blueprint for virtuous and stable government that was first sketched out by Plato in his *Republic* was not original with Toynbee. The idea was first sketched out by Alfred Howe Lybyer in his *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent* (Cambridge, 1913), an account of Ottoman administrative institutions in the sixteenth century that was almost entirely dependent on Western sources, travellers and diplomats. (Toynbee had been introduced to Lybyer by D.G. Hogarth at the Paris Peace Conference.) According to Lybyer, the
Ottomans, a dynasty of nomadic pastoralist origin (who were therefore incapable of generating a genuine civilization or new techniques of government), applied pastoralist answers to the problems of administering a vast empire over a long period of time. The subject population were the raiyya, or the flock; the graduates of the Palace School were the guardians; the Janissaries were the sheepdogs protecting the flock from the wolves. Toynbee nevertheless greatly developed and elaborated Lybyer’s metaphor and he went on to apply it to the Mamluks and Mongols – though he considered the Mamluk regime to be an instance of where the sheepdogs had eventually changed their coats and became wolves who fed upon the flock that they pretended to protect. (Subsequently the sheepdog metaphor was picked up and developed still further by Sir Karl Popper and by Ernest Gellner.) But Plato’s knowledge of Ottoman society was perfectly negligible. Moreover, those who have followed the Platonic model have tended to exaggerate both the importance of the Janissaries in the Ottoman military machine and the degree to which the Janissaries were segregated from the rest of the populace. There is really more to be said regarding the Janissaries as, in the long run at least, local factional corporations.

Toynbee’s approach to Ibn Khaldun and Islamic history in general suffered from various problems. In his determination to refute Gibbon’s notion that the downfall of the Roman empire (or indeed of any empire) could have been due to ‘the triumph of barbarism and religion’, he went to absurd lengths to deny the barbarian nomads any initiative or originality. Toynbee’s attempt to extend and adapt Ibn Khaldun’s theory to apply outside the Maghrib was perhaps also dubious. His account of the role of the nomad in Middle Eastern history was also impaired by his second or even third hand knowledge of Eastern sources. His knowledge of Ibn Khaldun was filtered through de Slane and Gautier. His ideas about nomads on the frontiers of China owed much to Lattimore’s Spenglerian formulations. Toynbee thought metaphorically and the rhetorical persuasiveness of his ideas owes much to the strength of the metaphors employed by him – metaphors which may have had their genesis in Plato’s Republic, De Quincey’s Revolt of the Tartars or Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Such metaphoric formations as nomadic reservoirs, the circulating flow of elites, the contrasting roles of wolves, sheepdogs and sheep can strike deep chords with readers. A Study of History, like an artfully constructed novel, can and should be read for pleasure.

‘Now what’s going to happen to us without Barbarians? – Those people were a kind of solution.’ (Cavafy)
TOYNBEE AND IBN KHALDUN

NOTES

12. Some of the most important criticisms, including those by the historians named above, were conveniently collected and reprinted in M. Ashley (ed.), *Toynbee and history: critical essays and reviews* (Boston, 1956). V. Mehta’s *Fly and Fly Bottle* (London, 1963), which is based on interviews with, among others, Toynbee, Geyl, Trevor-Roper and Taylor, gives a human dimension to the scholarly but sometimes acrimonious debate. S.F. Morton’s *A Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee* (Oxford, 1980), pp.3–38, provides a remarkably comprehensive bibliography of the responses provoked by *A Study of History* up to 1980. C.T. McIntire and M. Perry (eds.), *Toynbee Reappraisals* (Toronto, 1989) consists mostly, though not entirely, of papers which seek to rehabilitate Toynbee as a historian.
Introduction

Ibn Khaldun


27. Ibid., p.396.


29. Ibid., pp.88–111.

30. Study, p.452; Vol.8, p.10.


43. Ibid., p.lxxviii.
54. For Toynbee’s use of Lattimore, see *interalia*, *Study*, Vol.5, pp.315, 410, 449, 457–8; Vol.8, p.520.
60. Ibid., Vol.3, pp.32–3; Vol.7, p.29; Vol.10, p.234.